

287061

JPRS 81584

19 August 1982

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1700

19981120 199

Reproduced From  
Best Available Copy

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

15  
40  
A03

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

19 August 1982

## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1700

### CONTENTS

#### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

Col Gen G. V. Sredin Reviews Recent Books by Military Leaders (SOVETSKIY VOIN, Jun 82) .....	1
---	---

#### ARMED FORCES

Lecture on Lenin and the Defense of the Socialist Homeland (V. Korolenko; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA, Jan 82) .....	6
Importance of Physical Training Noted (A. Kondrashov; KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 1 Jul 82) .....	11

#### NAVAL FORCES

Gorshkov on Development of Naval Art of Warfare (S. Gorshkov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Jul 82) .....	15
Submarine Training and Related Activities (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) .....	26

Submarine Attack Training, by A. Veledeyev  
Submarine Rescue Training, by A. Veledeyev  
Capt G. Nikitin Discusses Training, by G. Nikitin  
Nuclear Sub Launches Missile, by V. Gromak

#### DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

Predraft Training of Youth Discussed (V. Butakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jul 82) .....	34
---	----

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

COL GEN G. V. SREDIN REVIEWS RECENT BOOKS BY MILITARY LEADERS

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 12, Jun 82 (signed to press 27 May 82) pp 18-19

[Review by Col Gen G. V. Sredin of books "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Homeland and the Cause of Communism] by D. F. Ustinov, Voenizdat Press, Moscow, 1982, 128 pages; "Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva" [Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland] by N. V. Ogarev, Voenizdat Press, 1982, Moscow, 71 pages; "Kollektivnaya zashchita sotsializma" [Collective Defense of Socialism] by V. G. Kulikov, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1982, 96 pages; "Ideyam partii verny" [Faithful to the Party's Ideals] by A. A. Yepishev, Voenizdat, 1981, Moscow, 96 pages]

[Text] The historic landmark 26th CPSU Congress recedes more and more into the past. But this only enables us to perceive more closely the wisdom and foresight of its recommendations and the comprehensive scale of its decisions. The summits of the party's forum reveal a broad and dynamic panorama of the current life of the planet, and they have laid bare with piercing clarity the acuteness of the struggle between two opposing directions in world politics, two ideological positions and moral approaches to the solution of the cardinal problems of mankind.

The course toward creative labor and peace, the curbing of the arms race, and the prevention of war, confirmed in the Program for Peace in the 1980s drafted by the 26th Congress, is being implemented consistently and firmly by our party and nation. But this course encounters increasing opposition from the ruling circles in the imperialist states, and primarily the United States. Vainly attempting to alter in its favor the current military-strategic world equilibrium, to place the socialist countries in a beleaguered position, and to restrain the pressure of the revolutionary and national-liberation movement, the imperialist reaction displays senseless adventurism in continuing to turn faster and faster the flywheel of the nuclear arms race and blowing up the foci of military conflicts into conflagrations. As a result of all this, as L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, "during the period covered by this report the party and state have displayed incessant vigilance toward problems of strengthening the defense might of the nation and the Armed Forces. We are obliged to do so by the international situation."



This conclusion, which imbues the hearts of Soviet fighting men with the feeling of special responsibility for fulfilling their patriotic and international duties, expresses the paramount and underlying idea of the series of books recently published by the Military Publishing House [Voenizdat] under the common rubric "Resheniya XXVI s"yezda KPSS--v zhizn'" [Implement the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress]. The behest of the party congress addressed to the fighting men of the Armed Forces is that they should reliably defend the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet nation--and all have adopted it as a militant program of action. The books in the series named above shed clear and broad light on this program, as well as on the particular ways of implementing it in the current sharply exacerbated international situation.

The book "We Serve the Homeland and the Cause of Communism" by the member of the CC CPSU Politburo, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, describes the current stage of communist construction in the USSR and formulates the tasks posed by the 26th CPSU Congress in the field of the economic and socio-political development of the Soviet society during the 11th Five-Year Plan period.

The greater part of the book deals with problems of the defense of the socialist Fatherland, the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the tasks ensuing from the decisions of the 26th party congress, and the recommendations of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The book "We Serve the Homeland and the Cause of Communism" stresses the objective necessity of defending the achievements of socialism, demonstrates the growth of the aggressiveness of imperialism, unmasks malicious lies and inventions about the Soviet military threat, and cites facts demonstrating the preparations of the NATO bloc for war.

Assessing the current stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov points out that their development is accompanied by scientific and technological progress. This has made it possible to devise nuclear missiles serving as a firm shield for the state interests of our country and the fraternal countries of socialism. Struggling to avert a new war, our party and nation do everything in order to prevent the aggressive circles from gaining superiority over the Soviet Union as regards conventional armaments. The Armed Forces are developing under the sign of further improvements in qualitative indicators of the mastery of arms and combat equipment, a steady advancement of land, air, and sea training, and the strengthening of organization and discipline. The combat efficiency of units, formations, and ships is growing.

The day-by-day practical activities of fighting men and their patriotic accomplishments reflect the remarkable characteristics, and primarily the firm socio-political solidarity, of the fraternal friendship of the fighting men of different nationalities. They demonstrate more and more fully a communist ideological outlook, political maturity, and discipline. The importance of the lofty educational role of the Armed Forces is growing.

The book devotes considerable attention to aspects of improving the training and education of the personnel and streamlining the combat readiness of the army and navy. In the current situation, as the author emphasizes, combat readiness must be steadily increased so that we would not be taken unaware by any surprise. Here the decisive role is played by commissioned personnel, the high moral-political and combat qualities of all military personnel, and their skill in using arms and combat equipment. The basis for the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces is their high level of combat training, knowledge of modern combat, and ability to achieve victory over a strong, well-armed, and well-trained enemy. Of great importance is the close coordination of different armed services, branches of troops, and special troops. The requirements for discipline and alertness of personnel as important components of combat readiness are being extensively tightened.

The author discusses in detail the decisive role of personnel in combat, given the features of modern warfare. Fighting is done not with numbers but with skill. This behest of Suvorov has remained topical to this very day. The fighting man should not only display superior mastery of all the most effective techniques for using the arms and combat equipment entrusted to him but also clearly grasp the missions of his subunit, formation, or ship, and know well his place and role in the execution of these missions.

Bringing the fighting men up to a high level of discipline, organization, and responsibility is an important aspect of the work of commanders, political instructors, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The chapter "For a High Quality of Training and Education" deals with competent planning of activities, a comprehensive approach to the performance of combat-training tasks, and constant improvements in the forms and methods of the training and education of fighting men. The troops must be taught what is necessary in warfare. For all the multiplicity of the forms and methods of training and education of personnel, the goals posed can be accomplished only if training problems receive concerted attention. These days this is an indispensable prerequisite for a high combat readiness. The work being done in this direction is considerable, as demonstrated, in particular, by the "Zapad-81" [The West-'81] maneuvers.

The last chapter of the book states: "The Soviet nation may rest assured that its child--the Armed Forces is ever on guard, ever alert, ever ready to repel aggression wherever it may come from."

The book by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, "Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland," deals extensively with an analysis of the military-strategic concepts of the United States and NATO, elucidates their evolution during the postwar period, and unmasks the aggressive orientation of the foreign policy of international imperialism. The Reagan administration, which came to power in the United States, set a course toward further exaltation of the danger of war. It has widely publicized its transition to the development of the so-called "new military strategy"--the strategy of direct antagonism" between the United States and the USSR on the global and regional scale, which has prompted unprecedented activity among the heads of the Pentagon as well as, at the same time,

unrest among and protests by the broadest circles of world opinion. Pursuing the goal of achieving at any price "a complete and incontestable" military superiority and the restoration of "the leading role of the United States in the world," the ruling circles of Washington openly bet in this connection on preparations for a protracted nuclear war.

A diametrically opposite class-political nature is displayed by the Soviet military doctrine, which reflects in a concentrated form the system of guiding principles and scientifically substantiated views of the CPSU and the Soviet government on the nature and conduct of the war that may be imposed on our country by international imperialism. It is on this basis that the doctrine determines the principles of the military build-up and preparation of the Armed Forces and the country as a whole to rout the aggressor. Underlying the military doctrine of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community are progressive and just ideas of defending the socialist accomplishments of the working people of the world as well as the security of nations. The book analyzes in depth the socio-political and military-technological substance of the Soviet military doctrine, the ways of meeting its requirements in the practice of military build-up, the combat and political preparation of troops and naval forces, and the education of military personnel. The author analyzes in detail the work to educate working people, and especially the youth, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism.

Nearly 40 years have passed since the ending of the Great Patriotic War. During this period virtually two generations of Soviet people have arisen--generations that are not familiar by personal experience with war and wartime deprivations. Educating them in the spirit of the glorious revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the older generations, in the spirit of readiness to selflessly defend the socialist Fatherland and fulfill with honor one's patriotic and international duty, is becoming particularly important, especially in the current exacerbated international situation.

...The book by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, "Collective Defense of Socialism," is devoted to problems of the further development and strengthening of the military-political defense alliance of the countries of socialism--the Warsaw Treaty Organization; deepening the broad cooperation of all socialist states in their struggle for peace and detente, and consolidating the defensive might. The book briefly recapitulates the genesis and growth of the international military organization of the proletariat that won the revolution, as well as of the armed defense of socialist achievements of working people. The Great October Revolution was a genuine school of internationalism for millions of working people in the foreign countries, and many of them defended with weapons in their hands the world's first country of victorious socialism. During the Civil War period alone more than 250,000 fighters representing many countries had joined the Red Army. On the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War more than half a million citizens of other countries fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet fighting men and fulfilled with honor their international duty. The nations of Europe shall never forget the heroic feats of the Soviet Armed Forces which, in mortal combat with the enemy, not only saved their Homeland but decisively contributed to the cause of rescuing European and world civilization.

The comradeship in arms engendered in the first years of existence of Soviet rule and further developed during World War II, by then in the form of the fighting community of nations and armies in their joint defense of socialist ideals, has in the postwar period acquired the form of a military-political alliance of socialist states--the Warsaw Treaty Organization. So long as the aggressive NATO bloc persists and international imperialism does not abandon its attempts to encroach upon the freedom and independence of the member countries of the socialist community, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its United Armed Forces shall perform in a solid phalanx their noble and responsible mission.

A guarantee of the successful implementation of the complex whole of the aspects of strengthening national defense and the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is provided by the organic unity of the political and military leadership of all aspects of the life of the army and navy and the steady increase in the effectiveness and quality of all forms of ideological and political-educational work with the personnel. These problems are comprehensively and deeply illuminated in the book by Arm Gen A. A. Yepishev, "Faithful to the Party's Ideals." The author confirms that a most important prerequisite for success in implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress as regards indoctrination work lies in a comprehensive approach and an inseparable relationship between the indoctrination of military personnel and the practical missions being accomplished by the army and navy. The core of all indoctrination work is the process of imbuing fighting men with a communist mentality and with filial devotion to our party and the Soviet nation.

The book analyzes specific features of indoctrination work and elucidates its main directions and ways of augmenting its effectiveness. In considering them, the author points to objective factors of the educational process in the army and navy--modern military training, rigorous military obedience, internal discipline, and the role of discipline and regulation-prescribed personnel relations.

The principal task of party-political work at present is to make the hearts and minds of every fighting man aware of the great meaning and historic significance of the documents of the 26th Party Congress and embody them in concrete actions. An important contribution to the accomplishment of this task is the publication of the series of books reviewed here. Each of these books illuminates from a different standpoint the complex and responsible missions facing the army and navy personnel and demonstrates specific paths for translating into reality the historic directives of the 26th CPSU Congress. These books will assist fighting men in studying more deeply the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. They teach fighting men alertness and courage and mobilize their creative energy for selfless service to the Fatherland and fulfillment of their lofty patriotic and international duty.

Copyright: "Sovetskiy voyn", 1982

1386

CSO: 1801/292

## ARMED FORCES

### LECTURE ON LENIN AND THE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND

Moscow AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA in Russian No 11, Jan 82 (signed to press 25 May 82) pp 19-22

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Korolenko: "V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Homeland" under the rubric "For Auditors and Assistant Directors of Political Study Groups": passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] To V. I. Lenin belongs the historical credit for a broad elaboration of aspects of the necessity of an armed defense of the socialist fatherland. This doctrine is based on a most rigorous consideration of the fundamental postulates of Marxism concerning the nature of the fatherland and the pertinent attitude of the party of the working class. It also is based on a profound analysis of the nature of the modern era.

K. Marx and F. Engels based their treatment of the concept of the "fatherland" on the class approach. Having unmasked the mendacious inventions of bourgeois ideologists concerning the single fatherland, they convincingly demonstrated that, under capitalism, workers lack a fatherland, properly speaking. The authors of the "Communist Manifesto" observed: "Proletarians own nothing that they would need to defend; they should destroy all that till now has defended and secured private ownership."

Following the overturn of the capitalist system and establishment of its own political rule, the working class establishes its own genuinely socialist Fatherland.

The Great October Socialist Revolution and the radical transformations that followed it in this country have resulted in fundamental changes in the social nature of our Fatherland. Having liquidated its centuries-long backwardness, our country turned into a mighty industrial-kolkhoz state. The decree of the CC CPSU "On the 60th Anniversary of Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" declares: /"There has never before in history been a state that within a short period of time accomplished so much for the broad development of its peoples and nationalities as did the USSR--the socialist Fatherland of all our peoples."/

It is recommended that this article be used in preparing political lessons on the topic /"V. I. Lenin on the Socialist Fatherland and the Necessity of Its Armed Defense"/.

The past 60 years have been marked by the strenuous socio-economic growth of our country. The share of the USSR in world industrial output climbed from 1 percent in 1922 to 20 at present.

Now the country disposes of vast national wealth estimated at 2.9 trillion rubles. The fixed assets of the national economy have reached 1 trillion 900 billion rubles.

The Soviet society today is the genuine fatherland of millions of people of various nationalities, active builders of communism and its tenacious and brave defenders.

On substantiating in theory of the historic necessity of defending the accomplishments of the socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin elaborated in depth the ways of organizing that defense and the dialectical approach to the selection of the forms and methods of struggle allowing for the particular historical situation and class relations in the country and on the international arena. He perceived two principal paths for the defense of the socialist Fatherland.

The /first/ path consists in an insistent struggle to avert war and preserve and strengthen peace. From the first days of its existence the Soviet state has been upholding peace and consistently struggling against aggressive wars. The Leninist appeal "Peace to the nations!" was sounded already in one of the first acts of the Soviet state--the Decree of Peace. That historic document formulated the basic principles of the peaceloving foreign policy of the socialist state.

The party and government always focused their entire foreign-policy activities on averting a war against the socialist state. The struggle to avert war and preserve peace has never been regarded by our party as a passing slogan. It was and remains the general foreign-policy line of the Communist party and Soviet state. Its recent manifestations in the present era include the Program for Peace, adopted by the 24th congress and elaborated and refined under new historical conditons by the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses.

Given the current exacerbated international situation due to the policies of imperialism, primarily American imperialism, the decree of the CC CPSU on the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR emphasizes the primary importance of an active implementation of the Leninist strategy of peace waged by our party and state.

The /second/ necessary and legitimate path of defending the socialist Fatherland lies in the armed defense of its achievements. It was Lenin's behest to us that our strides toward peace be accompanied by an ever alert military preparedness. He taught that no revolution is worth its salt unless it knows how to defend itself.

/Elaborating the doctrine of the defense of the socialist Fatherland, V. I. Lenin attached exceptional importance to the leading role of the Communist party in the formation and strengthening of the Armed Forces and augmenting their military might./



The historic experience of the growth of the Soviet state has wholly and entirely confirmed the strength and vitality of the Leninist doctrine of the defense of the socialist Fatherland. Soviet fighting men demonstrated mass heroism during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, and they reliably defended the achievements of socialism. V. I. Lenin proved to be truly prophetic in declaring: "That nation shall never be defeated in which a majority of workers and peasants have acknowledged, felt and seen that they are defending their own Soviet rule--the rule of the working people; that they are defending a cause whose victory will enable them and their children to enjoy all the blessings of culture, all the creations of human labor."

Lenin's ideas of the objective necessity of defending the socialist Fatherland as well as of the military organization of the socialist state were creatively elaborated to conform with present-day conditions in the decisions of the party, the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The Soviet people justly link with his name the accomplishments of the peaceloving foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the growth of its international authority and influence, and the securing of reliable defense of our Homeland and all other countries of the socialist community.

The implementation of these tasks by the Soviet state hinges on the economic and defense might of the country, on the state of the Armed Forces and the political awareness of the masses. This is reflected in the Constitution of the USSR, which states that the defense of the socialist Fatherland is a most important function of the state and a cause to the entire nation. By the same token, Lenin's precept of the necessity of constantly strengthening the country's defense capability has been embodied in legislation, and the state-wide, nation-wide nature of this task has been stressed.

In our state the function of defending the Fatherland is not associated with any aggressive designs against other states or the desire to aggrandize our territories at the expense of other countries and nations. On the contrary, this function is oriented exclusively toward assuring the security of the socialist Homeland against possible attack by imperialists and their accomplices.

Thanks to the unflagging concern of the party and government, the Armed Forces are equipped with everything necessary to defend the peaceful toil of the Soviet people. A distinguishing feature of Soviet fighting men is their exceptionally lofty moral spirit and constant readiness and capacity for feats of bravery in the name of the Homeland, in the name of the triumph of communism. As pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, now the ranks of defenders of the Homeland include the sons and grandsons of heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They did not experience the severe trials that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and nation.

Currently, nearly 100 percent of army and navy personnel have higher, secondary, and partial secondary education and about 90 percent are party and Komsomol members. These highly educated convinced patriots and internationalists, defenders of the Homeland, fulfill their duties worthily and with honor and are perfectly aware of the necessity and importance of their military activities.

Speaking of the tasks of the indoctrination and upbringing of military personnel, the chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, Arm Gen A. A. Yepishev, stressed the following in his report to the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations: /"It is important that all indoctrination work cause military personnel to clearly understand Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist Fatherland, instill conviction in the rightness and invincibility of socialism, operatively respond to the military actions of the imperialist states and their accomplices, and allow more fully for the increased requirements for the moral-political and psychological training of personnel."/

A limitless love of their multinational Fatherland is combined in Soviet fighting men with the feeling of fraternal friendship for the nations and armies of the socialist community, of solidarity with all the nations that struggle for their social and national liberation. They perform their duties in a solid phalanx with the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The military-political defensive alliance of the socialist states safeguards a historically unprecedented type of genuinely just and equal fraternal relations among nations. This alliance faithfully serves peace and offers an insurmountable barrier to the aggressive strivings of imperialism which has taken the path of dangerous teetering on the brink of war.

The direct responsibility for the current world situation is borne primarily by the United States imperialists, who have launched an unprecedented escalation of military expenditures. The 1981 military budget of the United States was unmatched in its history--more than US\$180 billion. This year allocations to the Department of Defense reached the record figure of more than US\$226 billion.

The need to strengthen the defense of socialism under present conditions is due to the sharp exacerbation of the international situation. Striving to halt the course of world history, obstruct the development of socialism, and smother the national liberation movements, the aggressive forces of imperialism unleash the arms race, rudely intervene in the affairs of other countries, attempt to dictate to them, and openly proclaim plans for unleashing a nuclear war. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed that in such a situation the economic and defense might of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, as well as their consistent peaceloving policy, arise with special clarity before all nations as the principal obstacle on the path of the warmongers and the chief support of peace on earth.

The militarist course and aggressive policy of the NATO bloc headed by the United States compel us to take measures to maintain at the proper level the defense capacity of the country and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Such is the severe necessity of the world of today, which requires diverting substantial resources plans for peaceful construction. But, as comrade L. I. Brezhnev points out, we are not spending and will not spend on these purposes even one ruble more than is absolutely needed to safeguard the security of our nation and its friends and allies.



Brought up by the Communist party, the Soviet fighting men are clearly aware of the complexity of the current international situation as well as of their tasks. In his report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov observed: /"Most of the formations, units, and vessels have successfully completed the winter training period this year. These results as well as the course of the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, demonstrate that communists and the entire personnel of units and formations correctly understand the present-day requirements of the party and the Armed Forces and selflessly labor to meet them."/ ✓

Copyright: "Agitator armii i flota", No 11, 1982

1386

CSO: 1801/295

## ARMED FORCES

### IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL TRAINING NOTED

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Kondrashov, Prikarpat'skiy [Carpathian] Military District: "What Makes the Infantry Strong: Monologues Recorded by a Military Journalist Following a Combat Exercise"]

[Text] They were given the works, as they say, during those days. First there was the exhausting march. This is no easy job at any time during a soldier's year. And especially after a copious rain a quick-step march is, it should be said, especially "satisfying." The already heavy shoes begin to weigh hundreds of tons. There is no shelter for you from the dampness, and even at night you cannot light a bonfire, because the "foe" is around you. In such weather the artificial nature of this ordeal makes it even more exhausting.

The "battle" culminates this chain of ordeals. An attack after a march sounds romantic, but that march has devoured too much energy while the "foe" has fortified himself at a cloud-capped height.

But the signal for the attack has been given and the motorized riflemen rush to give "battle."

Admittedly, it was not easy even for me, who joined the assault at the very foot of the mountain. Consider also the fact that I have been wearing a soldier's great-coat for some 10 years and am accustomed to a soldier's work. How much less easy it was for them?

The height has been captured. I walk about and look at the exhausted faces of the soldiers. One has weakly tumbled onto the ground, appearing to lack the strength for even waving his hand. The assault deprived him of all his strength.

And suddenly I heard laughter. I hastened to the adjacent hollow whence I heard a noise, and I saw...a small group of happy-looking people walking around and joking.

I asked the company's deputy political instructor Sr Lt Nikolay Fomichev: "Did not they take part in the assault?"

Nikolay smiled: "Actually, they were the first to storm the height."

When I approached, a brief command was given and the entire platoon rose to attention.

I asked the robust-looking sergeant who had given the command: "Why is your platoon nicknamed the 'sports' platoon?"

The deputy platoon commander Sgt Nikolay Kutsenko answered: "I don't know. It's just a joke by the boys. This is just an ordinary infantry platoon of motorized riflemen.

"You can well ask why: there are no record-breakers, no champions among us. There is not even one Master of Sports in the platoon. To be sure, one of us is close to that title--Givi Anguladze, our sports organizer, a Master's degree candidate.

"Before the army I dabbled a little in sports. In my kolkhoz, in Sumskaya Oblast, we played soccer, and in the brook we organized swimming races. But I did not qualify for any sports category.

"Here in the army I qualified for first category in heavy athletics and for second in light athletics, marksmanship, and skiing. Of course, I have my Military Athletics Complex [VSK] badge. In our platoon, incidentally, all the boys have these badges and have qualified for various sports categories. We rank first in the regiment in sports, and not only in that, because we occupy the leading place in combat training."

"Could it be that your platoon is deliberately composed of outstanding athletes?"

A short-statured soldier asked: "Permit me to answer."

He was Pvt Valeriy Andreyev, and he said: "There is no special selection. Instead, the boys in the platoon all without exception are physically developed and hardy."

"How did you become like that?"

"Before army service I used to stay home in windy weather. It was embarrassing for me to go to the beach, with my puny body. The only sport I indulged in was television viewing. I could watch hockey and soccer on TV for hours. I was a sports fan, and often got sick. [Play on words: "Bolel'shik" means both a sports fan and someone who is in pain] I was often on sick leave. After graduating from school, when I didn't get admitted to an institute, I worked as a laboratory assistant at a scientific research institute. That was just a job. I would rinse test tubes and sit down at a window. We used to while away the time on the windowsill. We looked on while the comrade scientists, docents, and degree candidates were jogging each morning, and we would joke saying that they were running from a [cardiac] insult to an infarct. But in the army I almost got a heart attack from jogging myself. That was following my very first cross-country march.

In the army I was assigned to a medical unit. By habit, I requested an exemption from physical education. The physician heard me attentively, examined me, and politely declared: 'Dear comrade! Your life is in danger. Unless you immediately stop smoking and engage in sports, I do not preclude a lethal outcome.'

"Of course, I didn't believe him. But during the next cross-country march I felt still worse. I recalled the physician's words and got scared of that outcome. I registered for a health group that was directed by our Givi Anguladze. At first I began, like that old professor, to practice jogging. It began to interest me, and I registered for the section of light athletics. Now I run 10,000 , whereas before I could not even run 500.

"Did I stop smoking? How else. What can you do when Komsomol activists attack you from all 'flanks.' A Komsomol meeting had resolved that all smokers should lift a barbell three times before entering the smoking lounge. And that barbell is sure heavy, being fashioned of worn tank treads. I was stuck: I could not even hoist it once.

"I got mad. I began to exercise with dumbbells and bars. I walked around with bloody bruises. Oh, I had suffered! My goal all the while was to lift that jury-rigged barbell. For a long time I could not do it--long enough for me to lose the smoking habit. But instead I conceived a passion for weightlifting. I qualified for the third category.

"In conclusion, let me say that soon it will be time for my pal Arkashka to join the army. So please convey through your newspaper a message from me for him that he should train himself physically for it, as otherwise he would not survive here."

I asked a sturdy black-haired fellow: "It would be interesting to know how the entire platoon became interested in physical education and athletics."

The fellow was Pvt Givi Anguladze, the platoon sports organizer, and he answered: "There is no secret about it. In my opinion, what does it boil down to? To desire. If a man does not want to, he will not even buy "satsivi" [?], let alone practice running. And forcing him would be no good.

"How to cure this? Here a lot depends on us Komsomol activists. How did we do it? It happened that the platoon was asked to dispatch a team of runners to a sports festival. There no volunteers, of course. An old story....

"Then I approached Valeriy Smirnov, our Komsomol group organizer, and asked: 'Dear Genatsval, what shall we do?' And he to me: 'We'll run ourselves.'

"We joined the race. There were three of us, instead of five. The third was another Komsomol activist, Oleg Pilipchuk, squad agitator. He was 'agitating' by personal example.

"We sure tried hard. The whole platoon came to root for us... But all the same we came out next-to-last place. We were ranked downward twice for appearing as an incomplete team.

"That was a disgrace, and all [in the platoon] felt disgraced. Then we organized an on-the-spot Komsomol meeting. We talked man-to-man.

"We began to train and have contests with each other. We organized platoon Olympics and established at them our own records, most of which we have been rapidly breaking. And some records, such as the ascent of the Caucasian mountains, remain unbeaten to this day. For example, Sgt Balakirev, now in the reserve, has the unbeaten record: just try to match this--climbing 76 times! I would very much like to do that, and so would the other boys. If the desire is there, no record can remain unbeaten!"

1386

CSO: 1801/285

## NAVAL FORCES

### GORSHKOV ON DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL ART OF WARFARE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 82 (signed to press 23 Jun 82) pp 10-18

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," by Commander in Chief of the Navy - Deputy USSR Minister of Defense HSU Flt Adm SU S. Gorshkov: "The Development of the Naval Art of Warfare"]

[Text] By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet naval art represented a harmonious system of views, on the basis of which the combat and operational training of the naval forces were organized and carried out, and measures were determined to assure the high readiness of the fleet.

In documents that regulated the combat activity of the Navy -- the 1937 Provisional Naval Combat Regulations (BUMS-37) and the 1940 Provisional Manual for the Conducting of Naval Operations (NMO-40) -- it was precisely pointed out that the navy must, in the event of war, support the ground forces in the coastal sectors and carry out independent operations at sea. In conformance with their purpose, the tasks posed, and the general principles of Soviet military art, the fleets prepared for aggressive, offensive actions in the open sea, in the air, and at the enemy's coastline, and for the active defense of friendly naval bases and fortified regions and the disruption of the enemy's naval communication lines.

During the 1930's our naval minds developed and created the theory of naval operational art. That theory contained the justifications and recommendations for the planning, preparation, and conducting of naval operations to destroy an enemy fleet at sea, and against bases and other important enemy objectives. Those minds developed with a large amount of completeness the operations on the enemy's naval communication lines, the operations intended to support friendly naval shipments, and other independent operations. A considerable amount of attention was given to operations conducted jointly with the ground forces: landing operations, operations launched against landings, and operations conducted for purposes of supporting their maritime flanks.

A typical feature of the prewar regulation documents was the fact that in them the preference was given to active forms of combat, to the striving to execute even the defensive tasks by means of decisive, offensive actions. They required the persistent search for and the bold attacking of the enemy under any conditions of the situation. As was pointed out in BUMS-37, "the constant striving to enter into

combat with the enemy for the purpose of defeating him must form the basis of the education and actions of every commander and fighting man in the naval forces of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]. Without any special orders to this effect, the enemy must be boldly and decisively attacked wherever he is detected"<sup>1</sup>.

On the eve of the war, the navy maintained high combat and mobilizational readiness. To no small degree that was promoted by the harmonious system that had been created and carried out under peacetime conditions for converting the forces to increased combat readiness, the organizing of naval reconnaissance, the patrol service, and all types of defense.

From the very first day of the war, all the fleets entered actively into the combat against the strong naval opponent, who was using the support of three air fleets and who, in addition, had at his disposal important strategic advantages which gave him the opportunity to launch a surprise attack. Their chief efforts were directed at the resolution of a very important task, which lay in providing support to the ground forces who were bearing the brunt of the country's defense against the enemy who had attacked and, in the final analysis, determined the outcome of the war. That is why actions that took on special scope were the joint actions of the army and navy in defense and during the course of offensive operations.

The Navy carried out support to the ground forces in defensive and offensive operations by the army groups by means of artillery and air support of their maritime flanks, by the landing of naval assaults, by supporting the operational regroupings of the forces and helping them to overcome water obstacles, and also by supporting the evacuation. An important role was played by the Navy in defending naval bases (VMB) and coastal areas. During certain offensive operations by the army groups on maritime sectors, the fleets carried out operations against the enemy's naval communication lines, destroying his transports with troops on board.

In the course of the war, various forms and methods were developed for organizing joint actions and for achieving their precise coordination on a strategic, operational, and tactical level. These were, first of all, the coordination of the actions performed by the army groups and fleets by representatives of the HQ Supreme High Command (SHC) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy; the joint elaboration, by army group and fleet headquarters, of the plans for operations; the precise organizations of control of the forces to be carried out from a single command post or from those situated in a row; the exchange of representatives among the headquarters of the various forces; the creation of a single command element when defending naval bases; the organizing and conducting of joint exercises and practice sessions during the period of preparation for operations; and the providing to the naval operations groups of means of communication and documents to support the combined actions.

In order to resolve the tasks to be executed jointly with the ground forces, the fleets carried out operations and conducted systematic actions which were usually component parts of army-group or strategic operations.

A scientific generalization of the experience that was accumulated in this regard was the development and publication in 1943 of the *Nastavleniye po sovместnym deystviyam sukhoputnykh voysk s Voyenno-Morskim Flotom i voyenno-rechnymi flotiliyami*

[Manual for the Joint Actions of Ground Forces and the Navy and Naval River Flotillas], which were approved by the chiefs of the RKKA General Staff and the Main Naval Staff of the Navy.

In addition to the general principles of interaction, the manual set forth detailed recommendations for the conducting of assault actions. It defined, among other things: stages of the landing operation; principles of organizing the forces and the command element; requirements for reconnaissance and camouflage; measures to create favorable conditions at sea and on the land; recommendations for the concentration of troops, the grouping of them in waves, distribution by detachments, and the organizing of the landing (factors that were considered to be very important components in the success of launching the assault by sea were secrecy and the organizing of all types of defense); the duties and interrelationships of the landing commander, the assault commander, the landing-base commander, the landing-point commandant; etc.

A considerable place in this document was assigned to recommendations for supporting the army's flank by means of the fire from shipboard artillery, by providing cover for the troops against strikes from the sea, and by the disruption of the enemy's shore and front-line naval communications lines.

A special part was devoted to the joint actions between the ground forces and the river flotillas along the water line, and also when forcing and defending rivers, when landing river assaults, etc.

The recommendations in the manual became an important testimony to the creative development of the theory and bold generalization of the experience of combat actions.

The wartime experience indicated that when, in the conducting of complicated and multilevel work in organizing interactions, both sides showed an understanding of the need for coordinated, joint actions for the purpose of achieving the final goal in the operation, success was invariably achieved, whether it be in defense or in the offensive. That is attested to by the statements and authoritative remarks made by many prominent military leaders -- commanders of army groups and armies. However, it was, unfortunately, not always like that. There were also individual instances when there was a lack of understanding of the role and capabilities of the fleet; when units [*soyedineniye*] had tasks assigned to them that were beyond their ability or were not typical of them; the lack of understanding of the peculiarities of the organization and essence of interaction as a bilateral phenomenon that was based on the interdependence of the actions of all the types of forces and the fighting arms participating in the operation. In these instances there also were failures, unjustified losses, and sometimes even the nonfulfillment of the assigned task. However, there were not many of them. One need cite only one example -- the unsuccessful actions on the Crimean Front (Commander, General-Lieutenant D. T. Kozlov; representative of the HQ SHC, L. Z. Mekhlis) in 1942, which lost the Kerch' Peninsula largely because of the unskillful organization of interaction with the fleet during the defense of the lines being defended by the front, and the unskillful repelling of the advance by the German fascist troops. That led subsequently to the loss of Sevastopol' and to the destabilization of the situation in the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front. The potential capabilities that



appeared as a result of the first powerful counterattack from the sea, which was executed jointly by the fleet and the army, as a result of the unskillful actions that followed, and the disdain for the use of naval support, were not realized, and as a result one of the largest operations of the Crimean Front in 1941-1942, in the final analysis, suffered defeat.

A task that became a very important one in the joint actions of the army and navy from the very first days of the war was the defense of the naval bases. The complexity of that problem was explained to a considerable degree by the insufficient preparation for its resolution during the prewar years. Naval theory proceeded from the assumption that the strikes that represented the chief threat for the bases were those from the sea. Therefore the preparation of the fleets for the defense of the bases was carried out in conformity with specifically those assumptions. The responsibility for their defense from the land was given to the army command element of the army, which, in its turn, considered it to be relatively improbable that the enemy would succeed in creating a threat to the bases from the land. But the situation turned out differently in real life. A threat to the naval bases arose specifically from the land -- on the very first day of the war, for the Liyepaya [naval base] and Khanko, then for Tallinn and Murmansk with Polyarnyy, and soon for Odessa, Sevastopol', Novorossiysk, and others.

The only naval base that constituted an exception was Khanko, which, by virtue of its geographical situation, had promptly and carefully prepared for defense from all directions -- from the sea, the land, and the air. The lines for land defense were previously equipped here, and they were reliably covered by a system of artillery and machinegun fire; a single command element and precise organization of control were created; and the garrison troops and the naval forces practiced their interaction. The naval base had in the necessary combination units [*chast'*] and subunits [*podrazdeleniye*] of ground, naval, and air forces, supported by all the reserves required for approximately a half-year. All this made it possible to render the defense of Khanko inaccessible. That defense lasted for 5½ months and was discontinued only on the basis of an order from the SHC, ending with the garrison evacuation that was skillfully conducted by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

The situation proved to be different in the Liyepaya area, the defense of which from the land was not prepared ahead of time. The creation of a command element, the gathering of forces, and the organizing of their interaction, as well as the equipping of the positions, had to be carried out hurriedly under strikes by the enemy's superior ground and air forces. The initial lines for its defense were created only 5-6 kilometers from the port and the city. That gave the enemy the capability of effectively using artillery against the objectives being defended. Despite the massive heroism and bravery demonstrated by the defenders, the base was able to hold up for only five days. The experience of Liyepaya was taken into consideration when defending the chief base of the KBF [Red Banner Baltic Fleet], Tallinn, the outer lines of which were shifted 30-45 kilometers away from the city. That experience also served as a serious lesson for the Black Sea Fleet, which carried out the prolonged, 73-day defense of Odessa and the heroic defense of Sevastopol' -- a 250-day operation that was completely unprecedented from the point of view of bravery or the art of conducting it. The success of the defense of those bases was organizationally supported by the creation of a single command element, which in Odessa was made the responsibility of the commander of the naval base, and

in Sevastopol', the fleet commander. All the naval, land, and air forces that were assigned for their defense were united into a special formation -- the defensive region.

The defense of the major naval bases actually fused into the defensive operations that were characterized by their considerable scope. The operational structure of the forces in such an operation included a grouping of ground forces, including marines, the forces for the defense of the water region and the ship's artillery support of the troops, an air group, and also *chast'* of shore artillery and air-defense troops.

A factor of extremely great importance for the stability of the defense was the continuous functioning of naval communication lines, over which the defending forces were supplied with the necessary quantities of reserve replacements and all types of supply. An important role was played by artillery and air support of the defending forces, which support was carried out by naval forces which had been specially assigned, as well as by other forms of support to the troops, especially the landing of naval assaults that launched counterstrikes against the advancing enemy.

When organizing the defense of the naval bases, a considerable amount of importance was attached to the initiative of the naval command element. A good example is provided by the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol', especially the latter, where the military council of the Black Sea Fleet, even before the arrival of the German fascist troops, organized the defense of the main base from the land, and had begun to equip three defensive lines around the city. The enemy's first attacks at Sevastopol' were repelled by the naval garrison, with the participation of the fleet's vessels and aircraft before the arrival of the Maritime Army units.

At the same time, in certain instances there were also shortcomings. For example, during the organization of the defense of the Novorossiysk base, the proper initiative and aggressiveness were not shown on the part of the base leadership for the creation of the all-around defense of Novorossiysk, although there was sufficient time for that. The leadership felt that that task would be completely resolved by the ground command element, failed to evaluate the extent of the threat hanging over the city with the advance of the German troops, and failed to take into consideration the lessons learned in the defense of Liyepaya, Tallinn, and Khanko, Odessa, and Sevastopol'.

It was only the interference of the senior command element that made it possible to carry out hurried defensive measures, with the Novorossiysk naval base being the only executor of the decisions from the superior leadership.

It must be noted that the organizing of the defense of naval bases from the land was, for our fleet, a task that was not typical of it. However, we were able to resolve it successfully. In the course of joint actions to defend the bases and the maritime beachheads, Soviet military art achieved a high level of development in the organizing and conducting of such operations. Not a single other country had examples such as the defense of Khanko, Odessa, Sevastopol', and Novorossiysk. As a rule, the naval bases capitulated as soon as they were surrounded by land. For example, there is wide knowledge of the shameful capitulation of the British in Singapore at the very beginning of the war in the Pacific.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, operations that became an extremely widely employed, and the most complicated and aggressive, form of joint actions of the army and navy were amphibious landings -- the crown of the art of joint offensive actions of the army and navy. It is not by accident that in the manual that has been mentioned the primary attention was devoted to questions of conducting landing actions.

At the same time it must be noted that during the prewar years the proper attention was not devoted to training for landings. We did not have any special landing craft, or landing means, or the necessary contingents of marines.

The art of landing actions received, during the years of the past war, especially great development of the following areas: the planning, preparation, and conducting of operations with a consideration of the strict coordination of the actions of the landings and the advancing troops in the army group; the organizing of landings of troops and equipment onto an unequipped coastline with the direct fire support on the part of the naval vessels and the aviation of the army group and fleet; the application of various methods for actions performed by tactical groupings -- the landing forces and troops to be landed; the organization of single administration of the forces in all links and at all stages of the operation; the organizing of party-political work; etc.

A variety of landing actions was the application of coastal convoy detachments (BOS), which were widely used in the river and lake theaters. Their makeup included vessels, marines, and sometimes also mobile artillery. The coastal convoy detachments supported the offensive actions of the ground troops that were operating in river sectors and provided cover for them during the forced crossing of water obstacles.

A differentiating feature of our landings was the short periods of time required to prepare them, as compared with those required in other combatant navies. During the first period of the war that was explained by the rapid changes in the situation, which hurriedly required a landing. During the subsequent periods, the amounts of time needed to prepare landings depended upon the plans and rates of the offensive operations in the maritime sectors. The tasks for the landing were assigned comparatively well in advance: for example, for the landing at Novorossiysk, 20 days in advance; in the Dnestr estuary, 14; in the area of the Tuloksa River, 10 days. It should be noted that the periods of time required to prepare the Anglo-American landings were measured in months, and the Normandy landing operation, in years.

The success rate of the amphibious landings, for all their brief preparation, was guaranteed by the high level of training in the marines and the rifle units that had been assigned to the assault, and also by the heroism of the participants; the high level of operational training of the staffs, the large amount of experience that was addumulated by the fleets, and the precise actions of all support links.

Exceptional attention was devoted to secrecy, which was achieved by effective measures of camouflage and by disinformation directed against the enemy. Suddenness of breakthrough in the defense against the assault and the landings frequently

was guaranteed by headlong actions without any preliminary artillery or air softening, and also by making landing directly at the moorings in the ports that were occupied by the enemy.

In the 1941 Kerch'-Feodosiya operation, a direct assault against the moorings in the port of Feodosiya was made by a cruiser, three destroyers, a minesweeper, and patrol boats. As a result a strike followed in a place that was most unexpected for the enemy. That method represents, without a doubt, the pinnacle of the art, boldness, skill, and precise computation.

It is important to know that measures to achieve surprise during an assault acquired special importance. They were developed in detail when planning every operation.

In generalized form these measures were developed each time on the basis of the conditions for carrying it out and they provided for camouflage, diversionary actions, the confusing of the enemy with regard to our intentions and plans, the secrecy of reconnaissance, and the establishment of the strictest regulations when using communication means.

Thus, during the course of the Great Patriotic War there was extensive development of the art of joint actions by the Soviet Army and Navy. Its ancient traditions, which had arisen as long ago as the civil war and the prewar years, were an important factor that assured success under the severe conditions of the struggle against German fascism.

In addition to the joint operations with the ground forces, the fleets throughout the war intensively waged combat actions against the enemy fleet. Those actions for the most part took the form of combat on the communication lines, in the course of which the Soviet fleets disrupted the enemy's naval shipments and defended our own communications. When these tasks were being resolved, there inevitably arose a conflict among various groupings of surface vessels, submarines, aviation, and sometimes even coastal artillery, as happened in the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets. Our fleet directly opposed the strong naval enemy, who suffered considerable losses of combat vessels, auxiliary ships, and transports. As a result the fascists underreceived millions of tons of strategic raw materials that were extremely necessary to them, and lost a large quantity of troops, means for supplying them, and combat technology.

All this attests to the great strategic importance of the naval actions on the naval communication lines for victory over the enemy.

With the purpose of disrupting the enemy's naval communication lines, strikes were made against his transports and the forces for maintaining them at sea and in the ports of loading and unloading. In addition, mines were laid at junctures of lines of communications, and on the approaches to the enemy's ports and in narrow straits.

During the first period of the war our fleets resolved the task of disrupting the enemy's naval communication line by using the method of systematic actions. In 1941-1942 for this purpose use was made chiefly of submarines and torpedo boats,

since aviation and surface vessels were taken away to be used for joint actions with the ground forces.

Something that attracts attention is the experience in using submarines in the Baltic in 1942. A factor representing great complexity for them was the forcing of the antisubmarine lines in the Gulf of Finland, which lines were saturated with positional means and vessel forces. Therefore, when planning the successive breakthrough against the enemy's communication lines by several waves of submarines, the fleet headquarters stipulated the operational support of the forcing of the antisubmarine lines by actions of the surface vessels and aviation, which were given the responsibility for conducting reconnaissance and inflicting strikes at the enemy's antisubmarine forces at sea and the bases. However, the situation on the ground front did not always make it possible to use these supporting forces, and the submarines frequently proved to be forced to operate independently. Despite this fact, during the second half of 1942 three waves of submarines, albeit with losses, forced the Gulf of Finland and waged successful actions against the enemy's communication lines in the Baltic Sea<sup>2</sup>.

As a result of the final transition in 1943 of the strategic initiative to the Soviet Armed Forces and the winning of mastery in the air, it became possible to involve in a much broader scale in actions against the enemy's lines of communications our naval aviation, which by that time had been provided with new aircraft. The basic means of combatting naval shipments continued to be the systematic actions of various naval forces. However, the leading role transferred firmly to naval aviation. It was precisely then that strikes began to be made more and frequently at convoys and ports by various aviation forces, and that increased their rate of results to a large degree.

With the beginning of the strategic offensive of the Soviet Army, and the surrounding on the seacoast of a number of groupings of enemy troops in 1944-1945, the role and importance of naval communications lines for the enemy considerably increased, and, at the same time, our fleets were presented with a broader and broader task of disrupting them. The successful resolution of this task by systematic actions alone would have been extremely difficult. Therefore the fleets changed over to a higher form of operational use of the forces -- the carrying out of naval operations on the enemy's communication lines.

The Black Sea Fleet in April-May 1944, in the course of liberating the Crimea, carried out an operation in which more than 400 aircraft of naval aviation, 13 submarines, and torpedo boats took part<sup>3</sup>. The interaction of the forces that were involved in the operation was of an operational nature. During the period of enemy evacuation, 102 ships of various kinds were sunk and more than 60 vessels and ships were damaged. According to data from the headquarters of the 17th German Army, the enemy losses constituted 42,000 soldiers and officers<sup>4</sup>.

Other actions that actually fused into this kind of operation were the actions of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the southern part of the sea in 1945, when the forces that were assigned to disrupting the enemy's naval communications lines, with his groupings that were pressed up against the sea, were 571 aircraft, 16 submarines, and a brigade of torpedo boats<sup>5</sup>. When strikes were being made at the ports of Memel', Liyepaya, Pillau, Kenigsberg, Danzig, etc., from where the

Germans were evacuating their troops, the aircraft of army-group and long-range aviation participated simultaneously with the air forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Submarines and torpedo boats attacked enemy convoys at sea on the approaches to the ports that were mentioned. It is well known that, as a result of the combat actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the enemy lost more than 350 vessels and ships of various types and displacement<sup>6</sup>. Approximately 17,000 soldiers and officers perished on three transports alone -- the Wilhelm Hustlow, the Steuben, and the Goya<sup>7</sup>.

A factor of great importance in the course of the struggle on the lines of communication was the interaction of the branches of the navy among themselves and with the supporting or attached forces. Unlike joint operations, where interaction, as a rule, was organized by the ground-forces chiefs, in the struggle on the lines of communication all the questions of organizing strikes at the enemy's fleet forces and transports were resolved by the naval command element, which determined the forces, areas, times, and objectives to be hit, as well as their sequence.

The struggle on the lines of communication required the involvement of all the forces in the fleets. The improvement of the methods for using them constituted an important element in the development of naval art during the years of the Great Patriotic War, which art formed the basis for the postwar preparation for the conducting of combat actions by various naval groupings at sea.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War a considerable place was occupied by combat actions to defend our own naval communications. In organizing that defense, the navy experienced great difficulties that were linked with the insufficient quantity and the technical level of the forces and means being drawn upon, and also by the lack of perfection in the objective being defended itself -- the transport fleet, which consisted chiefly of obsolete, assorted, mostly slow-moving ships. And if, under these extremely complicated conditions, they successfully resolved this task as a whole, that attests to the high level of skill in the command personnel, the good combat training, and the valor of all the people in the navy.

The Soviet Navy provided for the shipments, by sea, lake, and river, of 9.8 million persons and more than 117 million tons of military and national-economic cargoes<sup>8</sup>.

The defense of the naval communications lines included a broad series of measures. In order to fulfill them, use was made of submarines, aviation, surface vessels, coastal and antiaircraft artillery, as well as mines, nets, and other means. But the chief role was played by surface vessels and aviation.

The command element and headquarters of the fleets persistently sought the most desirable combinations of composition of transport ships in convoys and developed the optimal methods for organizing their protection. The idea of creating large convoys was overthrown, since, although it made it possible to resolve the task with forces that were not large with regard to the number of vessels, it gave the enemy the chance, by means of concentrated strikes, to disperse the convoy and then to destroy it piece by piece. The optimal form of providing for the security of navigation was therefore considered to be the



piloting of through convoys, consisting of as many as ten transports, with a well-substantiated ratio -- depending upon the specific situation -- between the number of ships and the naval forces supporting them.

The organizational measures of the fleet headquarters were reinforced by the measures adopted during the course of the war by the Supreme High Command with regard to the considerable intensification of naval aviation and the equipping of the vessels with new technical means and weapons. All this made it possible to achieve a considerable improvement in the means of defending the lines of communication. The immediate organization of the convoy service in the fleets was carried out by the convoy service offices, which engaged in the formation of convoys and the planning of their movement. Military sections were established in the steamship agencies of the navy, and, on large-scale ships, the officer position of deputy captain for military affairs.

The defense of the naval communication lines was guaranteed by the fleets chiefly by way of their daily activity. At the same time, under definite conditions, special operations were planned and conducted. The need for them arose in those instances when it was necessary to carry out the convoying of a large number of ships or transports with troops and important cargoes under conditions of considerable enemy counteraction. The greatest amount of experience in this regard was acquired by the Northern Fleet when organizing the defense of external convoys and the convoying of ice-breakers.

These operations, in the areas of the Barents and White Seas, were carried out systematically with the involvement of the basic forces of the fleet, and in a number of instances also the interacting units of army-group aviation with centralized control. In certain instances the tasks for the operation of supporting the external convoys were assigned by HQ SHC.

Thus, by directive of HQ SHC, dated 19 June 1942, the guidance and responsibility for the operations to be carried out in the Barents Sea to support the convoying of caravans of ships were entrusted to the commander of the air forces of the Northern Fleet<sup>9</sup>. A strike air group of the SHC reserve, air units from the Karelian Front, and fighter aviation from the Arkhangel'sk Military District were transferred to his subordination, and the air-defense aviation of Arkhangel'sk and Murmansk was also drawn upon.

During the operations the Northern Fleet deployed the submarines to intercept the surface forces of the enemy in the event of their attempts to attack the convoy; suppressed the enemy aviation at airfields and at the junctures of the lines of communications approaching the ports and the narrows of the White Sea; and carried out search and destroy missions against submarines and measures to provide antimine security. Fighter aviation was responsible for antiaircraft defense, carrying out, with part of the forces, a constant patrolling over the convoy, and other forces were in a duty status at the airfields.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet also resolved its tasks by the conducting of an operation in the course of operational regroupings of the troops of the Leningrad Front in 1944 (transfer of the 2nd Shock Army).

This very complicated interrelated complex of measures to defend navigation completely justified itself during the war years and served as a reliable foundation for the further improvement of the art of supporting our naval communications.

It should be noted that the views concerning the use of the fleets in warfare, which were expounded in the official documents of the prewar period, proved as a whole to be valid and corresponded to the conditions that developed during the course of the war. They correctly oriented the naval forces toward the struggle against a strong enemy at sea and on the land. At the same time the commanders and headquarters had to modify their views concerning many questions of the naval art at applicable to the real-life conditions of the situation that had developed, and to search for new forms and methods of combat application of the forces.

The art of employing our oceanic Navy, an art that arose during the postwar years, is based on fundamentally new material means for combat. At the same time it also uses the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, which continues to be important also under present-day conditions. Here I would like to note first of all the art of organizing the interaction among the branches of the Armed Forces and the branches of the naval forces, the methods of preparing the operations, the art of providing for complete support of the forces, as well as the experience of party-political work. Of great importance to us, especially for the purpose of educating the present generation of sailors, are the glorious combat traditions that were born in the fire of the Great Patriotic War.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. *Vremennyy Boyevoy ustav Morskikh Sil RKKA 1937 g. (BUMS-37)* [1937. Provisional Naval Combat Regulations (BUMS-37)], Moscow-Leningrad, 1937, p 10.
2. Achkasov, V. I., Pavlovich, N. B., *Sovetskoye voyenno-morskoye iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne* [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1973, pp 253-263.
3. *Ibid.*, pp 313-315.
4. *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945* [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 8, Voenizdat, 1977, p 152.
5. *Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva* [History of the Naval Art], Voenizdat, 1969, pp 389, 391.
6. *Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota* [Combat Path of the Soviet Navy], 3rd edition, expanded, Voenizdat, 1974, pp 320-324.
7. *Ibid.*, pp 321-322.
8. *50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR* [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 465-466.
9. *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945*, Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, pp 258-259.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1982

5075

CSO: 1801/316



## NAVAL FORCES

### SUBMARINE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

#### Submarine Attack Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant A. Veledeyev: "In a Complex Situation"]

[Text] --The Red Banner Northern Fleet--After breaking through the anti-submarine barrier, the missile-carrying submarine reached the area through which a group of the "enemy's" combat vessels was expected to pass. The hours of the search dragged on slowly and ended with a success by the sonar operators headed by Warrant Officer V. Vagonov, who is senior mate on the team and a Master of Combat Skill. The sonar operators detected a formation of ships at maximum range, which allowed the submarine commander to make the most effective decision. The submarine men destroyed the main target.

The "enemy" responded with bitter resistance. The escort vessels retaliated with a series of strikes. The missile-carrying submarine suffered serious "damage". The crew struggled to assure the ship's survival. In complex conditions, the submarine men manifested their skill and put the ship back into operation.

The missile-carrying submarine headed for base. But there was still one test which lay ahead--an encounter with an "enemy" submarine, a dueling situation. And again, the sonar operators distinguished themselves. This time, Warrant Officer V. Vagonov himself managed to be the first to hear the "enemy".

It is characteristic that this exercise at sea was conducted according to a program which was similar to the most complex voyages of the Great Patriotic War period. It is in this way that the submarine men are organizing their combat training with the maximum amount of work, and preparing a worthy reception for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

#### Submarine Rescue Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant A. Veledeyev: "Ordeal by Depth"]

[Text] A large explosion shook the submarine. The light went out in the compartments. The emergency lighting accentuated the paleness of the men's

faces. The submarine was descending and the sailors could do nothing to prevent it. On the phosphorescent screen of the depthometer, the needle was counting off the meters of the vertical descent. Suddenly, there was a mild thud: they had reached the bottom. The submarine men breathed a sign of relief: although they had collided with an "enemy" mine, it had occurred in shallow water.

After a thorough inspection of the submarine, it became clear that the damage was serious. The commander decided to take the personnel out of the bow torpedo tubes. He assigned direction of the rescue operation to Captain 2nd Rank A. Belov, who is an experienced submarine officer and the chief engineer...

In August 1941, submarine S-11 was destroyed, having been blown up by a bottom influence mine. The submarine lay at a depth of eight meters. Senior Torpedoman Senior Seaman N. Nikishin, Seaman Gunner V. Zinov'yev and Seaman Electrician A. Maznin were in the stern compartment, which was rapidly filling with water. They kept their wits and decided to leave the submarine through the torpedo tubes. But the tubes were loaded. Just to fire one torpedo would require high air pressure. The submarinemen decided to take the air pressure unit from a spare torpedo. After long and exhausting work, the torpedo was fired from the tube. Nikishin, Zinov'yev and Maznin successfully swam up to the sea's surface.

Courage, skill and physical preparedness are especially important for submarinemen in emergency situations. Therefore, Engineer Captain 2nd Rank Belov included in the first three-man team the most experienced and physically toughened sailors: Captain-Lieutenant V. Rochev, Senior Lieutenant N. Tylik and Warrant Officer V. Milyukov. They were to do everything to assure that not only would they themselves successfully abandon the submarine, but that their comrades would reach the surface.

Senior Lieutenant Tylik is first to squeeze into the torpedo tube. The diving suit hinders his movement. But he must crawl several meters, pushing in front of himself a buoy cable drum with a buoy line (a special rope which the remaining submarinemen will use to rise to the surface)...

On 1 May 1943, 11 sailors from submarine Shch-323, which had sunk after being blown up by a mine in the Leningrad Sea Canal, reached the surface after leaving through the torpedo tubes. Petty Officer 1st Class D. Trubin, who was the first to reach the surface and assess the situation, returned to the submarine through a torpedo tube. Of course, only a strong and physically mature man could have done this.

Senior Lieutenant Tylik had trained many times for such escapes. Without such a capability, he could not consider himself to be a complete submarine officer. But formerly, he had gone in the middle of the three-man team. At this crucial moment, the head of Bch-5 [naval unit 5] sent Tylik to pave the way for his comrades. The head of Bch-5 was confident that if any difficulties were encountered, first-class all-round officer athlete Tylik could cope with the difficulties more successfully than the other sailors.

Each decimeter of movement is made with difficulty. Yet, time must be conserved, since the entire crew is behind and each three-man team needs at least 5-6 minutes to overcome this unusual "obstacle course". Questions of physical toughness are especially relevant for submarinemen. It is not without reason that even on long voyages, the sailors regularly do various exercises, conduct military sports relays, sports festivals and competitions to determine the best all-round athlete on the ship. All the seamen, warrant officers and officers, headed by ship's commander Captain 1st Rank Yu. Lukashenka, a first-class athlete in skiing, soccer and weight-lifting, take an active part in the sports activities.

...After Senior Lieutenant Tylik, Warrant Officer V. Milyukov and Captain-Lieutenant V. Rochev squeeze into the torpedo tube. The torpedo tube is sealed hermetically behind them. Water quickly fills the tube, pressing their wet suits. The pressure becomes equal to the pressure outside the submarine. Now they can work.

Through the open forward door, Tylik sends the buoy cable drum with a buoy line to the surface. With the aid of mousings (unique knots of various sizes) on the rope, the submarinemen moving upwards will maintain their ascent to the surface. They are reminded of this a final time by a special chart attached to the inner torpedo tube door. It repeats, as it were, to those who already consider themselves freed from underwater captivity: "Don't forget, depth is dangerous!"

Senior Lieutenant Tylik was the first to reach the surface. He did not find the endless horizon of the open sea. No, this was the familiar hall with the pool and all the necessary equipment for conducting special training. And the fellow-members of the crew, who also had to make an emergency exit from under the water, did not experience the rigors of flooded compartments, but calmly repeated the instructions while awaiting their turns.

They are all experienced submarinemen, have often participated in distant voyages and carried out assigned tasks in an exemplary manner. Of course, they have not had to think about leaving through a torpedo tube: this modern ship has a high degree of reliability and the crew's skill-level is sufficiently high to ably use this reliability. It is not without reason that the submarine's engineering department has the title "excellent" and has been declared to be the best in the fleet for training its personnel to struggle for the ship's survivability. The crew regards this not only as a great professional success, but also as a sports success. After all, combat, even practice combat, is won by the bold, the steadfast, the strong and the hardy.

#### Capt G Nikitin Discusses Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEVDA in Russian 22 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Nikitin, commander of a nuclear-powered missile submarine: "The Ascent. Our Soviet Way of Life"]

/Text/ The author of today's discussion, Captain 1st Rank Gennadiy Anatol'yevich Nikitin, graduated from the

Kaliningrad Higher Naval School. After school, he served for 5 years as a navigator on a salvage and rescue vessel, then as an executive officer. He dreamed about serving on submarines and became a submarine officer. He advanced in the submarine service from electro-navigational group officer to commander of a nuclear missile submarine. He has 18 ocean voyages to his credit. For his successes in service, G.A. Nikitin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and many medals.

In the evening, after we have finished our business on the ship, we officers walk along the road which rises from the piers to a house on a small hill. Our naval station, widely dispersed among the rocky knolls, once began from this small hill. I stopped at this house and glanced back.

The silhouettes of the submarines clearly stood out on the smooth surface of the bay. Already during the morning here, a penetrating north-east wind whirled the snowy sleet. By noon, the wind had changed direction and immediately one could sense the approach of spring. At such a time, the polar regions are especially beautiful. The air is clean and clear above the snow-white and pinkish knolls. You can see very far and you have the feeling that all of our unbounded motherland is before you.

For some reason, I remembered a conversation which I had had a long time ago with a script writer and documentary filmer with whom I was acquainted. The conversation took place during the filming in our unit of various episodes for a film about the life and combat training of sailors. He asked me once, what I would begin a film about submarinemen with. I couldn't come up with an answer then. There are many interesting events in the vivid and heroic history of submarinemen in the Northern Fleet. Now, as I mentally peer into the distant past, I would answer that a film about submarinemen should begin with frames about our fatherland. It should begin with vivid and exciting frames which reveal the beauty of our native land and the great achievements of the Soviet people--creators of a new life. It should begin with frames telling what the navy men protect and take care of, why they keep their difficult watches. It should begin with Lenin's words about the great historical mission of the Soviet armed forces, how they are called upon to guard the achievements of the revolution and our people's power from all enemies. After all, these are the main things in a Soviet soldier's service.

My grandfather, Ivan Ivanovich Nikitin was chief of the searchlight operators team on the cruiser "Diana" and participated in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits. My father's fate was also linked to the sea. He was a naval aviator. He died while carrying out a combat mission in the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

So, it was understandable that when I was 11 years old, I announced to my mother my intention to enter the Nakhimov School.

What did I learn at Nakhimov School, the Kaliningrad Higher Naval School and later, during my service on ships? Of course, first and foremost I learned about military matters. I also learned to always and everywhere, in any position, carry out my daily affairs with a sense of my lofty responsibility for the nation's security, for an assigned task, for the ship entrusted to me and for the fate of my subordinates.

I remember that while I was still a naval cadet, I went through navigator practice on a harbor mine-sweeper which was conducting battle mine-sweeping in the Baltic. There were still quite a few mines remaining from the wartime. We destroyed them. I drew up a summary on tracing paper, according to which the maps and aids were later corrected.

It goes without saying that this accustomed me to preciseness and increased my sense of responsibility for work which I had done. By my signature, I was guaranteeing safe navigation for other ships and vessels in the area which we had swept. It perhaps was then that I actually realized the essence of Lenin's wise rule requiring "the most precise establishment of each individual's personal responsibility for a precisely defined task."

In one of his writings in 1922, V.I. Lenin talks about how hard it is to ascend to unconquered heights and what difficulties and trials must be overcome in storming the heights. But then, what satisfaction there is in conquering the heights!

So it is in our army and navy service, with their own unconquered heights, difficulties and trials. And the more complex a problem, the greater the satisfaction after it has been successfully solved.

Once, when I was a navigator on the salvage and rescue vessel, we got stuck in ice. Provisions had run out and water reserves had run low. Our vessel was slowly drifting onto a shallow bank. Ice-breakers came to our aid. But we had barely sailed out into open water, when a storm started. At this point, we received a mission: rendezvous with a tug boat and escort it to a distant point on the coast. As the saying goes, we went from the frying-pan into the fire. But when we succeeded in finding the small tugboat in the raging sea, when we had safely brought it to the point, it was as if there had been neither an exhausting storm nor sleepless nights. We experienced, perhaps, not even satisfaction for work well-done, but rather, a sense of inspiration with the boundless nature of human capabilities.

Speaking in a figurative sense, an officer's entire service is an ascent of the rungs of responsibility. The higher an officer is on the service ladder, the more responsibility he has. Responsibility was measured by one standard when I was an electronavigational group officer on a submarine, by a different standard now that I command a nuclear missile submarine. Think about it: the section of the Navy Regulations dealing with the basic duties of a ship's commander consists of 57 articles, taking up exactly 24 pages. The commander must be first in the crew in all classes of military matters: he must be first in the crew in all classes of military matters: he must be the best navigator, and expert tactician, a guardian of naval traditions, an expert on human souls. He must also be a man who fully bears responsibility before

the party and government for the constant combat readiness of his ship. Together with the political officer, the secretary of the party bureau and the other officers, the commander must rally the sailors, lead them forward and strive for success by the entire ship in every voyage, in every practice battle. This is a matter of the commander's honor.

In the past training year--the year of the 26th CPSU Congress--our nuclear missile submarine initiated the socialist competition in the navy. Our high obligations and the complexity of the tasks to be solved required maximum effective training by us, a creative approach to training, plus constant checking of our daily affairs against Lenin's behests to soldiers about maximum combat readiness and stern discipline. First and foremost, we paid particular attention to coordination and precision of operations by the ship's combat crew. We also paid particular attention to specialist training for all personnel, so that each man would really master military matters, would know how maintain complex equipment in a qualified manner and use the weaponry competently. Of course, we also paid attention to fostering an activist attitude towards life among the men, a sense of responsibility for fulfilling the obligations which they had accepted.

What were we able to accomplish? The vessel successfully carried out its missions in distant ocean latitudes. The crew attained high performance indices in missile and torpedo training. All of our officers and warrant officers, for whom skill qualifications were envisaged, became Experts in Military Affairs. More than half the seamen and petty officers became First Class Specialists and 85 percent of the personnel were rated as excellent. Due to the self-sacrificing labor of our entire crew, we are succeeding in reducing, by 8 percent, the amount of time needed to ready the ship for battle.

The ship's Komsomol organization recently was awarded the Komsomol Central Committee's Challenge Red Banner, for being the "best Komsomol organization on a submarine". Our Komsomol members are greeting the 19th Komsomol Congress with good work.

This year, the socialist competition is directed towards providing a worthy reception for the holiday of the peoples' friendship--the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. During the competition, the men are maturing, are being toughened ideologically and morally, are improving their knowledge and skills. I must say the kindest words about Captain 3rd Rank Ye. Romanov, who served with us until recently. His characteristics are sternness, and a demanding nature--first of all towards himself--plus a mature sense of responsibility. Romanov thoroughly recognizes that the development of contemporary means of armed conflict requires that an officer be a real expert in his work, a skillful navigator and a specialist. And Romanov does not spare himself in his ascent to great heights in military service.

Service aboard a submarine or any other ship presents very extensive possibilities for self-expression and creativity. I remember officer A. Kondyev, who served in our unit. When he was appointed director of the political studies group, he set up, with the commander's consent, a youth

political propaganda club on the ship, to improve the effectiveness of training. Somewhat later, again by Kondyev's initiative and under his chairmanship, a bibliophile club was set up on the ship. The activists organized their work so well that the ship commander's order about the results of the training year included a line about the notable contribution by the bibliophiles in forming a communist world-view and lofty moral and combat qualities among the sailors. To all this, we must add that Kondyev was one of the first among his peers to be qualified as an Expert in Military Affairs. He has prepared several scientific works which have been applied on ships.

Seamen and petty officers follow the example of officers. And when, as in this case, the enlisted ranks put their whole heart into carrying out their duties, then during their service in a unit, there are veritable universities on the ship. As Comrade L.I. Brezhnev correctly noted, young men enter the service without having gone through the school of life. But they return from military service as men already. They have gone through the school of restraint and discipline; they have acquired technical and vocational knowledge, as well as political training.

In our unit, on one of the ships there was an unforeseen occurrence during a voyage and the crew had to carry out its work in self-contained breathing apparatuses (IDA). After a certain amount of time had passed, Petty Officer 1st Class Anatoliy Korolev suddenly saw that a department chief had lost consciousness. Korolev immediately guessed the cause: the oxygen supply in the chief's apparatus had run out. Without a moment's thought, Korolev took off his IDA, put it on the chief and thereby saved his life.

Reflecting upon the motives for the petty officer's self-sacrificing deed, I thought that, of course, his actions were dictated by the aspiration, so understandable to each of us, to save a man's life. But undoubtedly, there was also a deeply understood sense of responsibility for the ship's combat readiness. After all, we say that an officer, a commander, is the head of everything; the success of the common cause depends on the commander.

Thinking about my service in the navy, about the service of Romanov, Kondyev and other sailors, about the brave deed by Petty Officer 1st Class Korolev, I can say with all conviction that service in the Soviet Armed Forces, on ships and in units ennobles the serviceman's personality and promotes his moral development.

The crew of our nuclear submarine, as any other military group, is multinational. But we work and serve as one harmonious combat family. In daily life, sailors of various nationalities relate to one another as blood brothers. Chuvash Warrant Officer S. Yefimov, an Expert in Military Affairs and a Komsomol member, helps Belorussian Senior Seaman I. Mlinovskiy master the electrician specialty. Kirghiz Senior Seaman K. Zhunushov, having become a First-Class Specialist during his first year in service, is passing on his knowledge and experience to Latvian Seaman A. Strazdin'sh. Each of our men goes through the great school of internationalism during his service on the ship. Mutual assistance and a kind comradely exactitude help us successfully solve complex and crucial tasks both at sea and at base.



In the navy they say: "The ship was made for sailing and the sea is a sailor's home." Ships leave their bases for a long time. Major difficulties befall sailors on long voyages. But, in the ocean, we never lose our feeling for the motherland. We know that the motherland supports us: we bear her state flag and are her plenipotentiaries. And this great and beautiful feeling for the motherland enables us to overcome all the difficulties and trials of long voyages.

In the center of our naval base, near the officer's club, there rises a monument to sailors of nuclear submarines. We see this monument every day. And every time that I look at the sculpted profile of the naval officer, I note in it familiar features of my fellow servicemen--their strictness, precision and courage. The creator of the monument, Captain 3rd Rank L. Ryaskov, served on a submarine at one time. He left a beautiful memory of himself, not only as a shipbased specialist, but also as an artist who instilled into his artwork the characters, and grandeur of the work and deeds of those with whom he shared long watches many meters below the ocean's surface.

They were watches permeated with a keen sense of responsibility for carrying out Lenin's behests, for the motherland's security, for the happiness and well-being of the Soviet people and for the preservation of peace on earth.

#### Nuclear Sub Launches Missile

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Gromak]

[Text] --The Red Banner Northern Fleet--Often during the drills at sea, the sailors of the missile-carrying submarine launched torpedo attacks, struggled to assure the ship's survivability and prepared for a missile strike. Captain 3rd Rank N. Misyutin, chief of the missile department and a Master of Combat Skill, devoted special attention to coordination of actions by his subordinates while working out effective means for using the dread weapons in complex conditions.

As a result, the submariners performed excellently during the final firing. Captain-Lieutenant O. Yarov and Warrant Officer Yu. Nachvay were the most precise in carrying out their duties. "Deviation-zero", reported the test range about the result of the missile launch.

9887

CSO: 1801/211



## DOSAAB AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### PREDRAFT TRAINING OF YOUTH DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by V. Butakov, first secretary, Primorskiy Kray Komsomol Committee: "Meridians of Patronage Friendship" under the rubric "Military-Patriotic Education of Youth"]

[Text] The sea has a special connotation to working people in our kray. It is where thousands of them are employed. Its blue expanses are crisscrossed by lanes linking us with friends and with trade partners in foreign countries. But we also remember well that it was the sea that was crossed en route toward our shores by interventionists during the Civil War. It was in the sea that the ships of Japanese militarists used to prowl during the Great Patriotic War. We know that warships of the imperialist states nowadays fairly often approach the very edge of our territorial waters. That is why the sea also is the site of ceaseless combat watch being kept by the sailors of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Their service and life always is in the eye of the working people of Primorskiy Kray, and the kray's Komsomol members, who are linked by ties of an ancient and firm friendship to the naval personnel.

This friendship has had an eventful history. In October 1922 the 5th All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League [RKSM, 1918-1924] resolved to become a patron to the Navy. All the Komsomol organizations in the country responded to this from their very heart. The first to report for naval service upon the appeal of the Komsomol, in late 1922, were young people in Primorskiy Kray. So many famed songs had been written about those ardent, unique times, about the bravery of the Komsomol members who had been building the fleet. Komsomol organizations helped their envoys as best as they could. That assistance, those gifts to the seamen, is now told by archival documents. Consider for example the description of a shipment dispatched to the fleet by a Komsomol organization: "Underwear, 24 pairs; pencils, 130; tobacco, 341 eighths of a pound; copybooks, 101..." Such figures seem insignificant these days. But behind them stands the famine of 1923.

These gifts are priceless; they lack a monetary equivalent. They are a shining embodiment of the boundless love of Soviet youth for those standing watch at the boundaries of the world's first socialist state. And the seamen repaid that love with heroic labors and lofty courage.

The Primorskiy Kray RKSM organization set up patronage commissions, while the ships and formations set up liaison commissions, which maintained mutual creative contacts.

We strive to develop and multiply the best traditions. Patronage service has been enriched by new forms of it. It is like a precious multifaceted crystal, and its brightest facet is its unflagging concern for staffing the fleet with the best members of the Komsomol. In the Navy our Komsomol identification cards have become weighty and authoritative documents. Commanders and political instructors have ascertained that, apart from a few rare exceptions, young people carrying these cards become the best crew members within a short period of time.

The ships under the Komsomol's patronage also are familiar with the high degree of preparedness of our envoys. The commander of the missile cruiser "Vladivostok," Capt 2nd Rank G. Il'in speaks very warmly of them. Those whom he especially singled out on the basis of the results of the recently completed cruise are CPO Vladimir Yarovoy, ship CPO Vladimir Kel', and CPO Dmitriy Novikov.

The landsmen are constantly interested in the affairs of the crew. Thus, recently, activists from the missile cruiser were invited to the Vladivostok city committee of the Komsomol. They described to their patrons the course of combat training and the achievements which seamen are readying in honor of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, as well as the performance of the young men from Vladivostok who had joined the ship's crew last fall. This was followed by a report from representatives of the youth of the twice Order-decorated Dal'zavod [probably, Far Eastern Shipyard].

The "Vladivostok" does not dock often at its home port. The place of her service is the ocean. Whenever possible, however, her crew are extremely happy to be hosts to their dear patrons. The cruiser has been visited by representatives of production collectives, members of student construction detachments, and concert brigades. As for the cruiser's personnel themselves, they are welcome guests at plants, institutes, and schools. The friendly contacts do not cease even during the cruiser's long-range cruises.

We are wholly justified in taking pride in the military accomplishments of the crew of the escort ship "Primorskiy komsomolets"--one of the best ships of the Pacific Fleet. Not so long ago, together with the secretary of the Komsomol kray committee N. Krivous, we visited that ship bearing a patronage gift for the seamen--a set of film developing laboratory equipment. We wished them new military achievements. This ship has been awarded the Excellent rating for the 12th year in a row.

Patronage ties between the Primorskiy Kray Komsomol and the fleet personnel are broad and varied. The kray party committee and the veterans of war and labor provide us with considerable assistance in streamlining such living and mutually enriching ties. One hundred and fifty Komsomol organizations in our kray act as patrons to ships and units. Firm and practical relations have been established, e.g. between fleet personnel and the young people working at shipyards. Joint Komsomol meetings have become a tradition. At these meetings, workers and Pacific

Fleet personnel discuss not only cultural, mass, and sports activities but also problems of improving the quality and effectiveness of operations on the ships under repair. Komsomol shock projects are announced there.

The kray and Vladivostok city Komsomol committees devote considerable attention to preparing young people for enrollment at the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov.

On the initiative of the kray Komsomol committee and the department for Komsomol activities of the political administration of the Pacific Fleet, there has been developed an itinerary of visits to sites of the revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of Primorskiy Kray and the Pacific Fleet. This is not quite an ordinary itinerary: the leading Komsomol activists of the kray and fleet followed it in a warship, visiting many Far Eastern harbors and meeting with workers of industrial enterprises, transport, and agriculture.

For this year plans exist to carry out many different measures contributing to the strengthening of mutually enriching ties of patronage and the years-long friendship between the youth of the kray and our fleet personnel. In the fall there will be held the Jubilee Komsomol appeal to the youth for service in the Navy. Challenge Red banners of the kray Komsomol committee will be awarded to the six best ship and unit Komsomol organizations. The regular annual graduation ceremony for the Komsomol reserve aktiv will be performed by the zonal Komsomol school whose evening courses also are attended by youths preparing themselves for military service. The Komsomol organizations of Primorskiy Kray continue their persistent work to train for the fleet an ideologically tempered, well-educated, and physically well-developed cadre complement.

The all-Union trip of Komsomol members and youth to sites of the Revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Communist party and Soviet party has become a veritable school of patriotic education, as has the all-Union search expedition "Annals of the Great Patriotic War." In the last 2 years alone more than 230,000 young people of Primorskiy Kray have journeyed on the paths of victories and partisan tracks followed by their fathers and grandfathers. The trackers identified hundreds of names of fighting men who had died in the war and established or complemented exhibitions at 1,180 museums, rooms, and corners of combat and labor glory. Some 200 monuments were erected or restored. More than 12,000 young men and women act as patrons to war veterans and families of dead fighting men. It has become a tradition in our kray to hold special weeks and months of mass-defense work, spartakiads [sports contests] for pre-draft youth, and ceremonial enrollment in the USSR Armed Forces for the young people responding to the appeal.

The achievements of the patronage work of the kray Komsomol organization have been rewarded with a commemorative Red Banner from the Military Council of the Navy. But we do not rest on our laurels. Fulfilling the decisions of the 19th Komsomol Congress, we shall continue to do whatever is necessary to provide well-trained young people for military service.

Patronage service is a great and important cause. Its meridians run across the hearts and minds of Soviet youth. Its lofty goal is reliable defense of our Homeland.

1386

CSO: 1801/284

END